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Engaging Buddhism is the most impressive, insight-ful, informative, and accessible book I’ve ever 
read on Buddhist philosophy, a subject I’ve studied for 
over 40 years, and in this assessment I include both 
primary and secondary sources, both Western and 
Buddhist. It is also one of the best philosophy books 
I’ve ever read—my few (minor) objections notwith-
standing. Engaging Buddhism is directed primarily at 
a Western philosophical readership, but is of perhaps 
equal value to Buddhist philosophers insofar as it ar-
ticulates many of Buddhism’s core philosophical val-
ues, to and for Western philosophy, and in a distinctly 
recognizable Western philosophical voice, but one 
that does no damage to the often radically different 
frameworks, methods, and modes of discourse that 
are distinctively Buddhist, much of which it presents 
in its own modality. 
Garfield argues throughout the text for the main con-
clusion that Buddhist philosophy is similar enough to 
Western philosophy to be recognizable as philosophi-
cally sophisticated, but different enough to be interest-
ing, challenging, and insightful. Garfield painstaking-
ly illustrates and deftly explains how various schools 
of thought and dialectical traditions within Bud-
dhism offer radically alternative but equally valid—if 
not often superior—metaphysical, epistemological, 
semantic, logical, hermeneutic, phenomenological, 
and ethical frameworks, methods, and arguments the 
cogency and overall coherence of which place a ra-
tional demand on Western philosophers to seriously 
reflect on the scope, validity, and objectivity of their 
own frameworks, methods, and arguments, and also 
a demand that Western philosophers engage with 
Buddhism as a significant philosophical partner in all 
of the above-mentioned areas of inquiry. In making 
this argument, Garfield introduces the Western phil-
osophical reader to a comprehensively representative 
sampling of many of the major Buddhist traditional 
divisions, schools of thought, inter-school dialecti-
cal tensions (as well as those developed in dialectical 
tension with extra-Buddhist orthodox and unortho-
dox Indian philosophies), canonical and authoritative 
texts, key figures and their commentators, concepts, 
terms, languages, methods, models, arguments, disa-
greements, concerns, frameworks, and issues within 
Buddhism, going into great detail when necessary, 
and glossing over details when details are unnecessary. 
Engaging Buddhism is not meant to be an introduc-
tion, but it serves nonetheless as an incredibly rich, 
informative view of the philosophical depths of Bud-
dhism from and for a Western philosophical perspec-
tive, striking an excellent balance between both.
Engaging Buddhism proceeds through this somewhat 
bi-philosophical hermeneutical project in a mode of 
philosophical discourse that is deeply informed by 
and engaged with the latest contemporary Western 
and Buddhist philosophical analogues, alike or un-
alike, in all the relevantly related philosophical do-
mains. Garfield’s comprehensive conceptual handle 
on the multiple dimensions, evolving stages, and dis-
ciplinary fields within both Western and Buddhist 
philosophical traditions is not only impressively ency-
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clopedic, but sagacious, and transparently grounds the 
many metaphilosophical insights that weave together 
the great variety of comparative and contrastive anal-
yses that function as premises in support of his main 
conclusion. 
Although I have disagreed with some of his specific 
claims in the past, and some in this book, I became an 
immediate convert to the main argument here upon 
reading the first chapter, and only more convinced by 
the time I reached the last. I only wish I’d read this 
text 40 years ago. Garfield has a way with words, to 
say the least, and with rendering comprehensible the 
most opaque, otherwise inaccessible ideas, on both 
sides of the philosophical divide. 
For example, take the tetralemma—p, not p (~p), p and 
not p (p^~p), p or not p (p v ~p) (alternately, either P 
is true, false, true and false, or neither true nor false)—
used by certain Indian philosophers. Garfield explains 
that, rather than affirming four truth-values, the tetra-
lemma reflects the same two basic truth-values (T/F) 
and two concatenation subsets (both T and F, and 
neither T nor F). I’ve never wrapped my mind around 
the first subset—the contradiction: p and ~p—as my 
instincts urge upon me the idea that if something is 
both T and F, it must be that an equivocation permits 
it. The negative version of the tetralemma is some-
thing I also haven’t been able to fully affirm, despite 
my own (seemingly decent) efforts at understand-
ing it and explaining it to my students: the so-called 
‘four-cornered negation’ in which each lemma is ne-
gated. The negated tetralemma applies, however, ac-
cording to Garfield, whenever there is presupposition 
failure. For example, given Buddhist skepticism about 
the incoherence of the concept of the (transcendent, 
immaterial, metaphysically substantive) self, none of 
these four truth-value possibilities is applicable: that 
there is a self (p), that there is no self (~p), that either 
there is or is not a self (p v ~p), that there is neither 
a self nor no self (~(p v ~p)). I can’t do explanatory 
justice to it, but, for example, one might imagine that, 
given Buddhist skepticism about the self, the ~p op-
tion would make sense: it is false that there is a self 
(~p). But that would be misleading, on the Buddhist 
tetralemmic view, somewhat akin to saying that it is 
false that the present king of France is bald (which 
cannot be stated non-misleadingly in simple proposi-
tional logic, but only in some sort of sub-sentential or 
predicate logic as a conjunction of the claim that there 
is a present king of France and the predication that he 
is bald, at least one conjunct of which is false). Similar 
reasoning justifies the other two concatenations that 
include the ~p option. 
Without the degree of formalism developed in West-
ern logics to deal with such puzzles, Buddhist logi-
cians nonetheless were onto presupposition failure 
informally, well over a millennium before Western 
logicians stumbled over it. Perhaps I’m inadvertently 
admitting my own philosophical limitations here, but 
my resistance to this can be expressed as follows: if 
there is no such thing as a self, then the claim that 
there is no self (~p) is true. If that is too simplistic 
because there is some sort of conceptual confusion or 
category error in the concept of the self (say, as might 
obtain if someone asserted the existence of nothing-
ness), then it might make sense to deny p, to deny ~p, 
and to deny p^~p, but it still seems sensible to assert 
~(pv~p): there is no truth or falsity to the claim that 
there is (or isn’t) a self. Maybe Wittgensteinian Bud-
dhists can accuse me of being caught in a (bivalent) 
picture, but this is one of the most puzzling items for 
me, along with paraconsistent logic.
While I cannot retrace the steps in my transformation, 
Garfield managed to convince me of the Wittgen-
steinian point that my confusion about and resistance 
to the use of the four-cornered negation here may 
very well be a function of the fact that I’m caught in 
a picture, in this case not necessarily bivalence per se, 
but (from the Buddhist perspective) a dualistic mode 
of conceptual proliferation, which then projects bi-
valence onto conceptually structured representations 
conjured to stand in for my experience (truth-func-
tional propositions), which experience might not ac-
tually admit of them in the way my consciousness is 
(habitually, but not necessarily constitutively) struc-
tured to conceive it.
 
The tetralemma is a relatively minor point among 
dozens of radically different ideas Garfield draws from 
Buddhism and presents as a challenge to the West-
ern philosophical mind to consider from the point 
of view of charitable interpretation, which attempt 
at charity Garfield facilitates by producing Western 
arguments, ideas, and analogies wherever appropriate 
(but frequently where ancient Buddhist arguments 
touch upon the same ideas), such as the Wittgen-
steinian concept of language games, Sellars’ myth of 
the given, nominalism about universals, the Gricean 
causal/intentional communicative model of meaning, 
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Humean sentimentalism and causal regularity, cri-
tiques of sense data, qualia, naïve introspectionism, 
reflexive versus hierarchical theories of consciousness, 
phenomenological bracketing, and mereological re-
ductionism, to mention but a few among many oth-
ers. Let me discuss, in some detail, a few other Bud-
dhist ideas Garfield presents, in a sequence that will 
hopefully lay some foundations for understanding on 
which to build as I proceed. 
In his introductory chapter, Garfield presents the es-
sentially soteriological/transformative orientation of 
all Buddhist philosophy as a function of (and response 
to) three inter-related core (metaphysical) insights of 
universal scope in Buddhism: impermanence, interde-
pendence, and absence (‘emptiness’) of self (of intrin-
sic, independent, essential, or self-nature—not only in 
humans or even sentient beings, but in all phenom-
ena). Because all phenomena and events are imper-
manent or momentary, nothing satisfies diachronic 
identity conditions, or endures unchanged through 
the series of changes. Because all phenomena origi-
nate interdependently, in complete causal dependence 
on prior and/or co-present conditions and phenome-
na, nothing has an essence or self-nature that is met-
aphysically substantive, independent, autonomous. 
Because all wholes are conceptual constructs mereo-
logically reducible to their ultimately atomic impar-
tite parts (psychophysical tropes), no composite even 
satisfies synchronic identity conditions, although in 
some earlier Buddhist (Abhidharma) schools, the at-
omistic tropes have intrinsic, substantive nature and 
identity, albeit momentary. 
These three metaphysical insights are common to all 
schools of Buddhism, though some are understood 
differently. They shape most if not all other doctrines 
and practices, including the Four Noble Truths—the 
Buddha’s four major claims, analogous to a medical 
assessment in offering a diagnosis of the human con-
dition (dukkha: existential suffering), an etiology (erro-
neous/illusory self-conception), a prognosis (nirvāṇa, 
the cure, is possible through reversal/removal of the 
cause), and a prescription (factors to cultivate to enact 
the cure) in his first public discourse, the fourth of 
which expresses the Eightfold Path to nirvāṇa, en-
lightenment; the Four Noble Truths are shared by 
all forms of Buddhism. Those eight elements in the 
Eightfold Path include ‘right’ (enlightenment-orient-
ed/soteriologically skillful) views, intentions, speech, 
action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and meditation. 
Each such element has an ethical dimension insofar 
as the reduction of dukkha is the primary aim of the 
enlightenment aspiration—one’s own and that of all 
sentient beings. Garfield explains that from the Bud-
dhist perspective, suffering is taken as obviously bad 
for all sentient beings, and since there is no real self/
other distinction, the reduction of suffering for all 
sentient beings is equally valuable. 
The purpose of the enlightenment aspiration—bo-
dhicitta (awakening mind)—is to reduce suffering, in 
oneself and all sentient beings. For an enlightened be-
ing will eliminate its own suffering and will be moved 
naturally to reduce the suffering of all sentient beings 
with which it comes in contact. That being so, the 
primary virtue to be cultivated in Buddhism is care, 
often translated from the Sanskrit and Pāli karuṇā as 
‘compassion,’ but Garfield prefers care because he sees 
that as more consonant with the function of the term 
in Buddhist doxography and practice: care expresses 
itself in actions and attempts to help beings cared for, 
and from the enlightened perspective—which lacks 
any self/other duality—all sentient beings are to be 
cared for, their suffering being equal. 
Because this soteriological orientation colors all of 
Buddhism, some have objected that Buddhist ethics 
is not really ethics, but some sort of prudential system; 
others focus on its emphasis on virtues, such as care, 
arguing that Buddhism is aretaic; still others argue 
that its emphasis on reducing suffering entails a nega-
tive consequentialism. Garfield rejects these attempts 
as Procrustean attempts to gloss Buddhist ethics in 
Western terms, which efforts threaten to distort what 
is really going on here. Garfield argues that Bud-
dhist ethics has a radically different orientation and 
framework: Buddhist ethics is a way of life designed 
to reorient the aspirant cognitively, affectively, moti-
vationally, and phenomenologically toward enlight-
enment and the reduction of dukkha for all sentient 
beings, by transforming the individual via the elim-
ination of erroneous/illusory self-conception, which 
thereby generates right view and spontaneous care 
as a default mode of enactive, embodied engagement 
with and comportment within the world. As such, it 
is not properly understood as consequentialist, deon-
tological, or aretaic, though it implicitly endorses a 
negative consequentialist value, places duties of care 
(which imply non-harm) on aspirants, and emphasiz-
es the cultivation of care and related virtues. There is 
no clean or sharp fact-value or prudential-moral gap 
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in Buddhism, for this sort of dukkha-eliminating so-
teriology determines Buddhism’s instrumental ethical 
orientation, the fact of suffering is taken as a univer-
sally valid experientially grounded natural fact, and 
the universal undesirability of suffering motivates its 
status as something to be reduced and eliminated for 
the sake of all sentient beings, oneself included. 
Apart from enlightened beings, such as the Buddha 
(who first figured this all out) and some of his fol-
lowers, most sentient beings suffer from (a sort of 
willed) ignorance of the three central, insightful met-
aphysical facts (impermanence, interdependence, and 
absence or emptiness of self-nature), what Buddhist 
philosophers typically call ‘ignorance’ but Garfield 
calls ‘primal confusion,’ ignoring these facts and im-
agining themselves to be autonomous, independent, 
metaphysically substantive (soul-like) agent-selves 
conceived as the diachronically identical unchanged 
bearers of their ever-changing minds and bodies, and 
thus principally oriented toward the satisfaction of 
their mostly ego-based desires, and the elimination of 
anything that thwarts them, in such excessive degrees 
as to constitute the “three poisons” of delusion, greed, 
and hatred. This false ego- or self-based conscious-
ness—primal confusion—is the central cause of ex-
istential suffering, dukkha (alternately, stress, dis-ease, 
dis-satisfaction). Buddhism’s sole purpose is the elim-
ination of dukkha in oneself and all sentient beings. 
The elimination of the primal confusion, the cause of 
dukkha, is the magnetic north of all Buddhist inquiry, 
practice, and value. Since delusional primal confu-
sion is what causes ego grasping and its excesses of 
attraction (to pleasure) and of aversion (to pain), its 
antidote is right view: soteriologically appropriate un-
derstanding of the illusory nature of the sense of self. 
And since what fuels primal confusion is mindless in-
attention to—ignoring—the actual phenomenology 
of experience (which, if attended to carefully would 
fail to support the false sense of self ), its antidote is 
mindfulness: moment-to-moment attentiveness to 
and examination of actual experience. 
Mindfulness (together with the other seven factors) 
is the prescription, and the cure is the penetrating in-
sight such attention to experience will eventually yield 
into the illusory nature of the sense of self, the full 
fruition of which is nirvāṇa, the blowing out of the 
illusory flame of ego and ego-grasping. The Eightfold 
Path is the specific prescription of eight components 
of one’s experience that need to be attended to in or-
der to attain nirvāṇa. Mindfulness is the key element 
because mindless inattention is what blurs cognition, 
yielding false view of self (primal confusion); mindful 
attention yields clear cognition and thus correct view. 
False view causes false beliefs about what is worth 
pursuing; correct view causes true beliefs about what 
is worth pursuing: the end of suffering for all sentient 
beings.
Returning to the bigger picture, Garfield lays out the 
structure of the rich dialectical progression from early 
Buddhist Abhidharma reductionism, to Yogācāra ide-
alism, which he insists is best understood as a distinct 
kind of phenomenology, and finally to Madhyamaka 
anti-realism/constructivism, delineating major theses 
and objections that led to the subsequent views Gar-
field explains as hierarchically stacked. The reduction-
ists insisted that all macro-level entities are designated 
as wholes solely by virtue of pragmatic conventional 
designations that are conceptually constructed but 
which designate what are ultimately mere aggregates 
of micro-phenomenal, highly ephemeral, impartite 
psychophysical tropes that are neither identical to the 
whole, nor to their configuration, nor which consti-
tute it. The idealists insist that all we are ever aware 
of are our own perceptual experiences, these are all 
projections of our conceptual proliferations, and thus 
there are no conceptualization-independent entities 
beyond what we experience. Garfield argues that the 
phenomenological interpretation of the so-called ide-
alists comports best with charitable interpretation, 
according to which—and all of this is simplifying 
greatly—what is bracketed is not the ontological im-
plications of experience in favor of its purely subjec-
tive experiential dimensions, but conceptual prolif-
eration altogether. The ground for doing so involves 
both transcendental arguments about the conditions 
necessary for the possibility of perceptual experience 
and about the (Nietzschean) self-refuting charac-
ter of bracketing ontology, on the one hand, and the 
authoritative claims of skilled yogic phenomenolo-
gists—beginning with the Buddha—who claim that 
conceptualization-free experience is not only pos-
sible, but nondualistic, direct, unmediated, and thus 
pure, on the other hand. The same arguments that the 
idealist deploys to call into doubt the external world 
apply equally to the subjective domain of experience: 
just as there is a gap between what is experienced 
and what may be causing it from the putative outside 
(God, an evil demon, the Matrix, etc.), so too there is 
a gap between what is experienced in a naïve realist 
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interpretation of introspection and what may be caus-
ing it internally (subpersonal, pre- or sub-conscious 
processes), in which case the anti-realists insist that 
whereas the reductionists privilege putatively objec-
tive micro-phenomena and the idealists privilege pu-
tatively subjective mental phenomena, since the same 
arguments that undermine the one undermine the 
other, both are dubious, on the one hand, but meta-
physically/epistemically equal, on the other. 
Garfield is keen to connect the arguments each such 
Buddhist school makes with relevant themes in con-
temporary phenomenology, cognitive science, and 
philosophy of mind, such as cognitive biases, cogni-
tive and perceptual errors and illusions, debates about 
whether perceptual consciousness is reflexive or nec-
essarily involves higher-order elements, and so forth, 
all of which are as rich on either side of the Western/
Buddhist fence. My summaries here are terribly inad-
equate relative to the rich insights and analyses Gar-
field delivers on the connections between all of these 
issues, each of which supports his general conclusion. 
Some objections I have must be prefaced with the 
disclaimer that they are minor. As they are all minor, 
I’ll just sample two as representatives. First, Garfield 
is no fan of the Nagelian construal of consciousness 
or subjectivity enshrined in the phrase ‘what it’s like’ 
(to experience anything) that has become ubiquitous 
in Western philosophy of mind and phenomenology, 
with loud voices like that of David Chalmers insist-
ing we could know nothing else were it not for our 
subjective consciousness, the explanatory puzzle of 
identifying how matter can be conscious at all that he 
identifies as the so-called hard problem (other prob-
lems, such as specifying the causal/functional neural 
correlates of various features of mind, such as lan-
guage processing, visual recognition, or memory, the 
grey matter correlates of which are being discovered 
on a regular basis, which he identifies as easy prob-
lems). But I think Garfield overstates his case against 
what it is like (to not be a philosophical zombie). Let 
me provide a fairly representative, somewhat lengthy 
quotation that I hope will illustrate this without much 
argument on my part:
“It may well be that the phenomenological pro-
ject as prosecuted by Dignāga and Husserl, and 
as resurrected by Coseru and Zahavi, may be mis-
guided for a simple reason: There may be nothing 
that it is like to be me because there is no me; 
there may be nothing that it is like for me to see 
red, because I don’t. Instead of a single locus of 
consciousness contemplating a distinct world of 
objects—like a Wittgensteinian eye in the visual 
field or a Kantian transcendental ego—to be a 
person, from a Buddhist perspective, is to be a 
continuum of multiple, interacting sensory, mo-
tor and cognitive states and processes.” (209)
Granted, a lot of reasonable argument precedes this 
dramatic set of proclamations, but it seems more rea-
sonable—to me—to deny that what it is like has the 
particular philosophical implications this or that phi-
losopher claims it does than to deny flat out that there 
is anything it is like to be a conscious being experi-
encing variously unique cognitive episodes, regardless 
of their ultimately complex, possibly deceptive meta-
physical/causal composition. Arguably, even enlight-
ened Buddhists are experiencing something in a way 
that is what it is like to experience the world, them-
selves included, which counts as the veridical, valid, 
or enlightened way, which must differ from what it is 
like for the rest of us to experience being caught in the 
grip of the picture of primal confusion. It must have 
been by reference to features of what that was like for 
the Buddha before and after his enlightenment that 
he managed to generate his medical analysis of what 
it is like for the human condition to be caught up in 
dukkha. 
Second, Garfield glosses over an issue that is dear to 
my philosophical heart, that of agency, self-regula-
tion, or, more problematically, autonomy or free will. 
Elsewhere (Repetti, infra) he has written a polem-
ic against the concept, arguing basically that it is a 
Western apologetic construct invented for Abrahamic 
theodicy in order to shift the blame to mankind for 
the Fall in Eden and the ubiquity of evil and suffer-
ing in a world believed to be created by an omnibe-
nevolent, omnipotent, omniscient being, a construct 
that holds no truck with the creatorless, impersonal 
Buddhist worldview. Here, however, he makes a num-
ber of claims that arguably contradict that stance. For 
example, he argues that mindfulness, attention to vo-
lition and experience, enables us to self-regulate, to 
transform habitual conditioning, to rewrite our own 
narratives, and so forth (288, 293, 306), but these abil-
ities arguably constitute some form of compatibilist or 
semi-compatibilist features of free will. But Garfield 
doesn’t really discuss free will here, except perhaps to 
intimate its irrelevance. My objection may be stated as 
a complaint that he missed an important opportuni-
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ty to at least spell out how various Buddhists do and 
might take different positions on a subject that has 
great traction among Western philosophers and even 
recently among Buddhists (see R. Repetti, Buddhist 
Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency (Routledge, 
2016). 
Again, before closing, I must reiterate that these sorts 
of disagreement are relatively minor, insofar as they 
constitute standard sorts of philosophical reactions 
to be expected, particularly in the face of very bold 
challenges to things typically taken to be extremely 
evident—in the case of what it is like to experience 
anything, as evident as anything else. Though they are 
my own, and I have a handful more of them, I would 
count them as less meaningful than a few dogs bark-
ing at a passing caravan (from the perspective of the 
caravan). 
In sum, Garfield has not only offered a blueprint for 
many major points where both Western and Bud-
dhist philosophical traditions may fruitfully engage 
with each other, but he has in many cases actually 
demonstrated how, making many points of dialectical 
exchange for both sides, in the course of constructing 
his overall argument. Engaging Buddhism is one of the 
most significant contributions to the Western recep-
tion of and engagement with Buddhist philosophy. 
This book is a must read for Western philosophers, 
but also for Buddhist philosophers who attempt to 
engage Western philosophy, as this blueprint is bi-di-
rectional. 
Engaging Buddhism begins with a preface that situ-
ates the text, followed by an introductory chapter 
introducing Buddhist philosophy (basic Buddhist 
concepts, orientation, terms, history, etc.), followed 
by two chapters that explore metaphysics, a chapter 
on each of the self, consciousness, phenomenology, 
epistemology, logic and philosophy of language, and 
ethics, and a concluding methodological post-script 
on how to interpret and evaluate the project, followed 
by references and an index.
